Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin has presented sweeping new recommendations to protect the future security of his network Ethereum against the development of quantum computers. Buterin, a well-known name in the crypto world, focuses especially on strengthening the cryptographic foundations of the network.
Security Steps Against Quantum Threats
In Buterin’s recent statements, attention was drawn to four main components in the Ethereum network that are vulnerable to possible quantum computing attacks. It was emphasized that validator signatures, data storage processes, signatures of user accounts and zero-knowledge proofs at the application layer are not quantum resistant with current technologies.
Ethereum’s blockchain currently uses Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signatures. Buterin suggested switching to hash-based signature algorithms at the consensus layer in the network, which are more resistant to quantum attacks. In particular, he points out that the choice of the hash function will form the basis of Ethereum’s security infrastructure in the coming decades and points out that it may have long-term effects in this regard.
Data Authentication and Cryptographic Passage
Kate-Zaverucha-Goldberg (KZG) commitments, which are used to store and confirm data in Ethereum, are not quantum-proof in their current form. Buterin states that in this respect, STARK-based zero-knowledge proofs that are resistant to quantum attacks may be preferred instead of KZG. However, this change requires serious work in terms of engineering and careful planning comes to the fore for a smooth transition.
He draws attention with the assessment that this transition may be the last hash function of Ethereum and emphasizes that this choice should be made meticulously.
Signature Schemes and the Impact of Bulk Verification
Currently, Ethereum’s user accounts prefer a signature algorithm called ECDSA, and this algorithm poses risks against quantum computers. Buterin suggests enabling flexible signature schemes at the protocol level and allowing users to switch to lattice-based, quantum-resistant algorithms at any time. However, post-quantum signatures require much larger data sizes and more gas costs during the process than traditional methods.
At this point, he emphasizes that instead of optimizing the network, recursive aggregation verification of signatures and zero-knowledge proofs at the protocol layer will provide the main solution. Instead of validating each transaction or proof individually on-chain, checking thousands of signatures and large data sets under a single “verification framework” can significantly reduce the cost per transaction.
A large number of these frameworks can be combined in a block and large-scale zero-knowledge proofs can be processed efficiently. Thus, the verification burden is moved from personal transactions to the public block level and the scalability of the post-quantum security system is increased.
Buterin’s evaluation also points out the “Strawman” road map published by the Ethereum Foundation. This roadmap includes expectations for shortening block times and transaction finality times in the future.
